Kant The Categorical Imperative The ordinary man needs philosophy because the claims of pleasure tempt him to become a self-deceiver and to argue sophistically against what appear to be the harsh demands of morality. This gives rise to what Kant calls a natural dialectica tendency to indulge in plausible arguments which contradict one another, and in this way to undermine the claims of duty. This may be disastrous to morality in practice, so disastrous that in the end ordinary human reason is to be found only in philosophy, and in particular in a critique of practical reason, which will trace our moral principle to its source in reason itself. A reviewer who wanted to find some fault with this work has hit the truth better, perhaps, than he thought, when he says that no new principle of morality is set forth in it, but only a new formula. But who would think of introducing a new principle of all morality, and making himself as it were the first discoverer of it, just as if all the world before him were ignorant what duty was or had been in thoroughgoing error? But whoever knows of what importance to a mathematician a formula is will not think that a formula is insignificant and useless which does the same for all duty in general. The Categorical Imperative has been the subject of debate since Kant first wrote his moral works. Philosophers have argued as to what Kant intended its true meaning(s) are and what the problems with these various definitions are. In the 20th Century there has been a significant rejection of the traditional view of Kants Categorical Imperative. Leading this movement was Paton, Duncan and Williams. More recently joining the debate was Gregor, a student of Patons. These writers, while they may not agree on exactly how many possible definitions there are for the Categorical Imperative, they each see that there is definitely more than one conception of this term. This essay will explore the diverging and common a...
